报告题目：Mandatory ESG disclosure, executive incentive and ESG performance

报告人：潘小飞

时间：2024年4月12日10:00-11:30

线下地点：ug环球视讯官网创新港涵英楼经济金融研究院8121会议室

报告人简介：

潘小飞，伍伦贡大学副教授（终身教职），本科毕业于东北大学，硕士毕业于大连理工大学，博士毕业于伍伦贡大学。潘小飞教授研究领域包括：公司金融，制度经济学以及银行研究。目前已经在Management Science（UTD24）， Review of Finance（FT50）， Research Policy（FT50）， Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Banking and Finance等期刊上发表了20篇高质量论文。目前担任Emerging Market Review副主编。

摘要：

In this study, we investigate the interplay among mandatory environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure regulations, executive compensation, and corporate ESG performance. Using a sample of 8,177 firms across 42 countries during the period of 2002-2020, we find that firms subject to mandatory ESG disclosure are likely to adopt ESG contracting for CEOs by 25% after mandatory ESG disclosure, in comparison to other firms. Additionally, we observe that mandatory ESG disclosure alone has a limited impact on corporate ESG performance, while companies that tie CEO compensation to ESG metrics post mandatory ESG disclosure experience noteworthy enhancements in ESG performance, i.e., a 13.64% surge in their ESG environmental score, a 6.36% increase in total waste recycled, and a 1.7% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. This study contributes to the understanding of the economic mechanisms underlying ESG transparency regulations, underscoring the importance of instilling appropriate managerial incentives to realize the regulatory effectiveness of disclosure regulations.

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2024年4月7日